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 450 College English
omposition is an ongoing historical project: the name given to work done in 
colleges and universities, mostly in the United States, by students and teach-
ers as they engage and mediate differences in written language. That is the 
definition I am willing to offer, knowing that it is at best only a beginning 
and necessarily incomplete. 
Composition’s difficulties arise in part out of the tension built into the term 
itself as a referent for not only an activity and the product of that activity, but also 
the material social conditions of that activity: not only what is understood to be the 
composing process(es) of individual students or groups of students (or other writ-
ers) and the textual products of these processes, but also the full panoply of material 
social conditions and practices out of and within which such processes and products 
appear—the “field” of composition, composition programs, and the history of these. 
Hence composition may be used to refer not only to a kind of text and the means by 
If oppositional strategies are conducted from within the same framework as that which they 
oppose, they run the danger of reproducing those same positions.
—Alastair Pennycook (“English as a Language Always in Translation” 43)
Just because [compositionists] have been funded with a reductionist notion of our task has not 
meant that we have been bound to follow through in a reductionist way.
—Charles Bazerman (“Response” 252)
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which such texts are produced, but also and at the same time to the authors of such 
texts, the courses in which they deploy particular means to produce such texts, the 
programs responsible for such courses—their design, staffing, and maintenance—and 
the professional academic disciplinary participation in and study of the programs, 
courses, students, texts, and activities by which those texts are produced in relation 
to one another—Composition writ large. 
The undeniable location of the work of this Composition in material social 
history (compare, for example, biology) distinguishes the difficulties besetting it—its 
lack of academic institutional status and the working conditions and perquisites at-
tending such status—from the difficulties of definition and purpose experienced by 
other disciplines as they revisit, redefine, and defend their terms, aims, procedures, 
and value (see, for example, Burawoy; Firth and Wagner), in keeping with their own 
location in material social history. For although every discipline faces on occasion 
the challenge of self (re)definition (think of the range of scientific fields that have 
arisen in the last century), few are defined in terms of their material social location 
within academic institutions or identified with that location, as composition is. In-
stead, following the ideology of professional academic disciplinarity, most deny that 
location in defining themselves.1
Dominant efforts to respond to the very real difficulties of those working in 
composition (as students, teachers, scholars), rather than engaging composition’s 
location and character as material social practice, have followed the lead of these 
other fields. In so doing, they have accepted dominant culture’s limited conceptions 
and valuations of composition as low, limited, preparatory, illegitimate. Such efforts 
produce and maintain a “discourse of need” about composition itself, defining it as 
lacking what dominant culture identifies as legitimate disciplinary characteristics 
and therefore as in need of either abandonment or supplement.2 So, for example, 
graduate programs to prepare teachers of courses in composition are themselves 
dubbed not programs in composition but, instead, in Rhetoric and Composition; 
Writing Studies; Writing, Rhetoric, and American Culture; Rhetoric, Composition, 
and Literacy Studies; Critical Studies in Literacy and Pedagogy; Language, Literacy, 
and Rhetoric; or Composition and Cultural Rhetoric (compare Hesse xii).
Clearly, there is use in exploring interrelationships between composition as I 
have defined it earlier and work identified with these other terms. Nonetheless, it 
is worth questioning the assumptions driving a discourse attempting to identify, or 
replace, composition with these other terms. In that discourse of need, the work of 
composition serves as foil to the alternatives (or supplements) that are proposed, and 
both the work of composition and the proposed alternatives are removed from their 
location in time and (social) space as always emergent, fluctuating, material social 
practices. Thus ideological misrecognitions (in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense) aligned 
with dominant cultural identifications of both composition work and the proposed 
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alternatives are achieved, as evidenced in the gap between, on the one hand, repre-
sentations of either and, on the other, actual practices and locations: the ongoing 
history of composition work in the United States and elsewhere of students, teachers, 
scholars. And, thus, both the promise and ongoing daily accomplishments of work 
in composition go unrecognized, while alternatives occluding these are heralded. 
Commodifications of knowledge and learning are substituted for the ongoing work 
of knowing and learning, and dispositions of flexibility in keeping with fast capitalist 
dictates are pursued as ideals. 
I argue that to break with this discourse of need and give full play to all that 
might and does get accomplished in the work of composition, we need to rethink 
terms used to define, and limit, composition: writing, pedagogy, theory, modality, and 
composition itself. This is difficult insofar as it entails engaging dominant representa-
tions of composition to call them into question: to think of both the existing terms 
of our work and also the terms we would exchange them for differently, lest we 
unwittingly lapse into accepting what the dominant predisposes us to recognize as 
the “new,” “alternative,” and “different” as new, alternative, and so on, and, more 
significantly, as preferable to what the dominant predisposes us to recognize as the 
old and inadequate, and thereby to operate within the very terms of exchange set 
by the dominant. Moreover, rethinking the terms used to define composition is dif-
ficult insofar as it requires that we acknowledge both the effectivity, on the ground, 
of dominant representations of composition work (and their officially designated 
alternatives) and, simultaneously, their inadequacy. Finally, this is difficult insofar as 
many of us are disposed, by our misrecognition of the very material social conditions 
enabling our participation in such rethinking, to conceive of both our task and the 
subject of our task in immaterial terms. In other words, rethinking the terms of work 
for composition necessarily requires rethinking the work of theory itself as material 
social practice, a “process in society” and “social intervention,” as Stephen Resnick 
and Richard Wolff put it (2, 3), not opposed to material social practice but instead 
itself a particular form of material social practice. 
To illustrate the depth of the reach of the discourse of need over the last decade 
and its limiting characteristics, I first consider as a case in point the operation of that 
same discourse in two seemingly opposed calls for ending composition that have ap-
peared during the past ten years—David Smit’s The End of Composition Studies and 
Sidney Dobrin’s Postcomposition. Smit’s book calls for an end to composition studies 
in light of its apparent failure to fulfill its official institutional charge of writing skills 
transmission, whereas Dobrin’s book calls for moving “post” composition as a way to 
abandon the attempt to do so. But for my purposes here, what is compelling about 
these two works is their alignment in accepting the dominant’s definition of com-
position, despite their opposition to one another, and thus their joint participation 
in that discourse of need, demonstrating its reach across apparent divides. I analyze 
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the apocalyptic rhetoric found in both to help bring into sharp relief the assump-
tions and moves driving not only their arguments but, as I will show, those deployed 
in seemingly less apocalyptic, but increasingly pervasive, calls to expand or move 
beyond or supplement composition in light of its perceived lack—the participation 
of all such arguments in that same discourse of need. 







ing, with hegemonic relations of power what the argument is either resigned or aligned 
to, leading consequently to change being understood in apocalyptic terms as tragic 
resistance, revolution, and/or violent breaks with the past.
	 •	The	past	itself	is	treated	as	a	known,	finite,	and	stable	entity	discrete	and	different	from	
what is claimed to be current or new.
	 •	Difference	is	understood	as	deviation	from	a	norm	of	sameness	rather	than	an	inevitable	
characteristic of all writing, including writing that is conventionally identified as “the 
same.” 
	 •	Theory	is	treated	as	an	escape	from	practice	rather	than	a	practice	itself	with	material	
social effects, encouraging blindness to the alignment of theoretical practice aimed at 
the “different” with dominant ideology and its reinforcement of that ideology.
These assumptions govern efforts to understand and address composition’s 
difficulties, shaping not just the solutions various such efforts provide but also the 
definitions of the problems to be addressed. As I will argue, these assumptions 
thereby perversely reinforce the very difficulties prompting these efforts. Drawing 
on the strategies deployed in J. K. Gibson-Graham’s critique of “capitalocentric” 
(Postcapitalist 2) discourse in economics and Theresa Lillis’s critique of the treatment 
of writing in sociolinguistics (Sociolinguistics), I outline an alternative approach to 
addressing real limitations in disciplinary discourse, using James Slevin’s argument 
for composition as intellectual work (Introducing English) to illustrate such strategies, 
and I sketch a reworking of the seemingly “ordinary” in composition as one means 
of deploying such strategies.
It’s worth emphasizing that the challenges facing those working in composition 
to which this discourse of need responds are real, hence there is genuine exigence for 
the efforts of all those participating in that discourse, whatever questions arise about 
the specific directions those efforts take. These challenges include, among many oth-
ers, the perduring poor working conditions for those teaching composition; highly 
questionable staffing of course sections and student placement and exit procedures; 
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conservatism in program administration and pedagogy; and the seeming impotence 
of those working in composition to withstand institutional and larger sociopolitical 
pressures on the definition, conduct, conditions, and valuation of their work. But, 
ironically, the discourse of need ends up leaving these unchallenged: understood at 
best as “problems” rather than problematics. Alternatively, I argue for engaging the 
ongoing, necessary, inevitable rewriting of composition, a possibility that appears 
once we recognize its always emergent, varied, and changing character. 
C o m p o s i t i o n  a s  F a i l e d  d e l i v e r y  o F  m a r k e t a b l e  W r i t i n g  s k i l l
Smit’s The End of Composition Studies offers one permutation of this discourse of need. 
In his book, Smit defines composition strictly in terms of pedagogy, understood as 
the transmission of knowledge of how to write (tout court) to students, in the form of 
general writing skills, in a first-year composition (FYC) course, that will be applicable 
to future challenges students face elsewhere: “Broadly speaking,” he asserts, “the goal 
of composition studies is to promote the use of writing: to help people acquire the 
knowledge and skill they need to convey what they want to say when they put pen 
to paper or fingers to the keyboard” (1). However, given the apparent inability of 
research to date to demonstrate any general writing skills and the apparent tendency 
of writers only to “acquire” skills at writing in particular ways through immersion in 
specific communities of practice, Smit concludes that composition needs to end. In 
other words, the work of composition is understood in terms of the official charge 
assigned to it by institutional and other authorities, a charge that it appears unable 
to meet and so should resign from attempting; instead, it must redirect its energies 
toward facilitating the kind of acquisition of skill in writing in particular ways, in 
specific disciplines, that Smit thinks does occur.
Although it might seem, from this account, that Smit recognizes the instability 
and variability of writing, in fact Smit uses writing in two contradictory senses.3 On 
the one hand, he uses it in the singular as a noncount noun condensing all activities 
and products associated with the term into a single, uniform entity: writing. This is 
the meaning he invokes in the “basic” questions that he argues composition needs 
to return to—“What is writing? How is writing learned? Can writing be taught, and 
if so, in what sense? And if writing can be taught, how should it be taught?” (2). On 
the other hand, he also uses writing to refer to a broad range of highly differentiated 
practices and products—what scholars of writing (including “composition” scholars) 
have for some time now documented (see, for example, Lea and Street, “Student”; 
Thaiss and Zawacki). Smit defines composition as tied indelibly to the first under-
standing of writing, hence the need for composition to come to an end. In other words, 
because he defines pedagogy as the transmission of a single codified and fixed set of 
skills and knowledge, whether through explicit instruction or through scaffolding or 
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some other means, the inability of researchers to identify a universal set of these for 
writing (or, conversely, researchers’ findings of myriad shifting kinds of skills and 
knowledge involved in writing) leads him to the conclusion that composition is at a 
(dead) end: there appears to be no single set of forms and skills, or even knowledge 
about these, to transmit, and worse, even if there were, they don’t seem to “transfer” 
to sites beyond FYC.4 Thus, Smit’s assumption of a transmission model of pedagogy 
and a uniform concept of writing at odds with what compositionists in fact recognize 
paints him (or the field) into a corner: as he puts it, “[N]o one ever learned to write 
primarily by completing a two-course sequence in writing at a college or university” 
(182). So he proposes a WID-like alternative as the only viable option. 
Smit’s concluding position is aligned with an acceptance of status quo power 
relations as set. His argument thus exemplifies what Mary Lea and Brian Street have 
identified as an academic socialization model of academic literacy, characterized as being 
concerned with students’ acculturation into disciplinary and subject-based discourses 
and genres. Students acquire the ways of talking, writing, thinking, and using literacy 
that typified [sic] members of a disciplinary or subject area community. The academic 
socialization model presumes that the disciplinary discourses and genres are relatively 
stable, and once students have learned and understood the ground rules of a particular 
academic discourse, they are able to reproduce it unproblematically. (“The ‘Academic 
Literacies’ Model” 369)
As Smit himself puts it, “[W]riting is a process of socialization, of novice writers 
learning to use writing as a tool in order to accomplish particular tasks that they find 
meaningful and useful or in order to belong to social groups who can use writing 
as a means of participating in the group” (61, emphasis in original; see also 182). 
Smit thus adopts what social theorist Anthony Giddens has identified as a normative 
functionalist reading of institutions and social practices: things are as they are and 
operate as they do because that is what their appropriate function is.5 In this reading, 
official accounts of apprenticeship models are taken as both the full and normative 
representation of them: the conditions and practices that we should aspire to. Such 
an approach ascribes to institutions and institutional processes the nature and value 
of what they officially claim to be, and thus reinforces status quo relations of power 
and the practices maintaining these. While the institution and institutional practices 
of composition are defined as dysfunctional, work in disciplines outside composition 
and outside the academy is treated as functional, its processes and contours right—
functioning normatively—by virtue of being as they are.
This alignment of Smit’s position with a normative functionalist perspective can 
best be found in his invocation of the (free) market as the criterion against which we 
can judge writing and its teaching. So, for example, he contrasts classroom instruc-
tion in composition (defined as dysfunctional) with the expert-novice model. In his 
representations, whereas writing in the composition classroom is not real writing 
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but instead merely an exam (147) or “practice” (165) for what might come later, in 
the novice-expert socialization process, 
Novices [. . . .] receive help in writing as they need it or want it, or it is forced on 
them. If they have a particular problem with writing, they will find out about it all 
too quickly and “naturally.” They will not accomplish with their writing what they 
set out to accomplish. Their boss will send back their memos for revision because 
they have not adequately addressed the issues they were assigned. Their editors will 
reject their essays because they have not been sufficiently literary or insightful. The 
city commission will reject their petitions because they have not been sufficiently 
persuasive. The members of their community will provide the responses, the feedback, 
the criticism they need. (148) 
Here the invisible hand of the (free) market is implicitly invoked as an explana-
tion of why some writers and writing receive praise and others don’t. In this fantasy, 
writing simply is or is not persuasive, literary, insightful, effective, as determined by 
its “buyers” or consumers: bosses, the public, editors, those whose authority to know 
what is and isn’t good writing goes unquestioned, like that of purchasers of stocks 
and other commodities: the market, here as elsewhere, decides, and its decisions 
are by definition right in determining the value of what is purchased. Or, as Smit 
claims, “[T]he only way to determine whether novice writers write adequately is to 
see if their writing accomplishes their purposes outside the classroom in the larger 
‘marketplace’” (156). Smit follows this claim with a demurral—“not all writing must 
accomplish real effects in the world analogous to a company selling a product”—but 
then reasserts the rightness of the marketplace: “[W]ithout the constraints of that 
larger marketplace, how do instructors go about determining what students need to 
know in order to become better writers?” (156). 
In keeping with free market ideology, students themselves are also identified 
as the free agents of the learning marketplace: the consumers who by definition are 
always right and whose desires are both fixed and entirely their own.
[S]tudents are responsible for their own choices, their own goals, their own values, and 
we are bound to respect those choices, those goals and values. [. . .] [W]e cannot set 
ourselves up as experts in ends, in what students might choose to do with their lives. 
We can only offer our judgment of means. [. . .] give them as much help as possible 
in choosing the ends they wish to pursue. (Smit 192)6
Hence Smit argues that course descriptions should “specify the purpose of the writ-
ing required in the course, the theoretical or ideological framework of the course, 
and the discourse community to which the course is designed to introduce students” 
(192). But while it seems indisputable that course descriptions should not deliberately 
mislead students, and that students, like their teachers, should have their current 
views acknowledged and taken seriously (not to be confused with being taken un-
critically), it is also patently obvious that, once we relocate work in composition as 
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material social practice, no course description can fully represent what students, or 
their instructors, will encounter or produce in a course, and that individual as well 
as collective student needs, desires, views, and beliefs, like those of other humans, 
are inevitably in flux, diverse, often contradictory, and not fully or readily available 
either to them or their instructors for inspection. 
It is Smit’s free market fantasy model that requires a transmission model of 
pedagogy, which in Smit extends to the demand for a “truth in advertising” of 
course descriptions whereby teachers must tell the student consumers what those 
enrolling will be getting, and, of course, teachers must then deliver what’s promised, 
and students are assumed to know what they want and will need. This is the same 
assumed model behind the current wave of demands for (school) accountability, 
requirements for statements of “learning outcomes” for all courses, and so on. It is 
a model that elides the overdetermined character of any educational work in favor 
of a simplistic model of learning as information or skill transfer, and of knowledge 
as commodity. As in those demands, Smit treats the complexity of such work not as 
a problematic but as a problem, something to be avoided or eliminated rather than 
engaged. Thus, although Smit makes the occasional nod toward the possibility of 
change and difference resulting from student apprenticeships with the discourse 
communities they have somehow chosen to join, his general argument is to make 
writing instruction more efficient in delivering specific writing skills demanded by 
employers and therefore, it is assumed, desired by the students as (simply, only) 
future employees. Having established for himself that no general writing skills exist 
to be transmitted, he argues for transmission of writing skills specific to particular 
disciplines and work sites and is disturbed at the extent to which composition courses 
fail at this task, asking rhetorically, 
[I]f school genres lack sufficient context to help students grapple with all of the rhe-
torical constraints they will confront in the world at large, just how useful are they in 
preparing students to write for that world? [. . .] [W]hat sort of “real-world” genres 
are writing classes supposed to be training students to write? Or what sort of skills 
are school genres supposed to be honing that will transfer to writing outside of the 
classroom? (148)
The fact that “what students write in college does not sufficiently prepare them for 
writing in the workplace or in other nonacademic settings” (153) is seen as a flaw 
in composition pedagogy to be corrected or lamented, not an inevitability to be 
engaged, explored, embraced.
We thus see in Smit’s argument a treatment of writing as a stable entity and 
pedagogy as (ideally) the means to transmit skill in producing it efficiently, in align-
ment with status quo power relations and hegemonic ideals. Composition’s past, 
and its knowledge, are treated as knowable and known; difference is understood 
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not as the norm of writing but as deviation from a norm of sameness, with varieties 
of writing as each internally uniform rather than in flux and in fluctuating relation 
with one another. Practice is something following research and theory rather than 
in dialectical relation with it: classrooms are where theory and research are to be 
applied rather than the site of theorizing and (real, versus a simulacrum of) research. 
r e W r i t i n g  C o m p o s i t i o n  a s  H e g e m o n y  i n  
s t u d e n t  t r a i n i n g  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t
On its surface, Dobrin’s Postcomposition would seem to represent the complete coun-
terargument to Smit’s The End of Composition Studies. In fact, Smit had positioned his 
argument against earlier arguments Dobrin (in Constructing Knowledges) and others 
had made against a concern with pedagogy as evidence of the field being “mired in 
a Hamlet-like ambivalence about what it knows, what it ought to do, and whether it 
has the means or the will to decide” (Smit 7). And in turn, in Postcomposition, Dobrin 
positions his argument against Smit’s (and similar arguments) insofar as Smit concerns 
himself “within a rubric of classroom and student” (Dobrin, Postcomposition 10). A 
full consideration of Dobrin’s argument in Postcomposition is beyond the scope of this 
essay. For my purposes here, what merits attention is the continuation in Dobrin’s 
argument of the same discourse of need by which composition is deemed lacking, 
a discourse that accepts the dominant’s terms for composition and its alternatives, 
landing Dobrin’s argument, like Smit’s, firmly in the lap of the hegemonic, notwith-
standing his efforts to the contrary.
Like Smit, Dobrin declares composition as at an end, something we should aban-
don in light of its putative limitations. But while, for Smit, composition is at an end 
because of the failure of composition pedagogy to meet the needs of the dominant, 
Dobrin calls for composition studies to break with the “pedagogical imperative” (as 
well as the “administrative” imperative) and with student subjectivities altogether 
in favor of pursuing writing/theory. For Dobrin identifies composition itself as de-
fined (limited, hobbled) by its commitment to pedagogy and the administration of 
pedagogy and of student subjectivities. As he puts it, the difficulty with composition 
is its “inability to articulate an intellectual focus beyond the training of teachers, an 
activity set in service of the continued management of student bodies rather than in 
pursuit of understanding of writing in the formation of the signifier ‘student’” (18; 
emphasis added). Given a view of pedagogy as “training” and “management,” com-
position, for Dobrin, is not worth keeping to. In place of composition, so defined, 
Dobrin argues for the study of writing, defined as a “producing machine” of subjects 
and subjectivity, a study that will “reconfigur[e] [. . .] the subject as posthuman, non-
autonomous agent” (17). 
At various moments in Postcomposition, it appears that Dobrin’s project is meant 
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to spur rethinking of the terms defining composition in ways aligned with the argu-
ment I am making here. For example, Dobrin explains that postcomposition is not 
“no-student” but, rather, “post-student as student is currently conceived” (15), and 
that postcomposition is meant to enable us to “think ‘differently’ about writing than 
disciplinary limits have previously allowed or encouraged” (189). In such statements, 
there is the potential to rethink conceptions of student and, by implication, pedagogy 
(and, of course, writing). But that potential is undercut by Dobrin’s acceptance of 
dominant conceptions of pedagogy.7 For in the same breath as he argues for being 
“post-student as student is currently conceived,” he insists that postcomposition is 
“certainly postpedagogy.” This acceptance of dominant conceptions of composition 
pedagogy is confirmed by his call for the work of theorizing writing, understood as 
“not the work of a teaching subject nor dependent upon the role students play in 
making writing an object of study” but as something that “is—and must be—bigger 
than the idea of students” (15).
Thus, although Dobrin’s argument is clearly opposed to those, like Smit’s, 
concerned with producing a more efficient composition pedagogy for students, 
and would seem to share the aim of my argument for the need to rethink the field’s 
discourse, his argument, like Smit’s, assumes a debased view of the work of composi-
tion—most prominently, pedagogy and work at the pedagogical scene. His argument 
differs from Smit’s only in choosing to abandon that work rather than replace it with 
WID. And so, while he offers no idealist or fantasy portrait of how writing pedagogy 
should work, what he does propose is no less idealist—that is, removed from mate-
rial social history—than Smit’s proposed “solution.” In place of composition, with 
its “neurosis of pedagogy” (28), Dobrin advocates what he terms “writing studies” 
(25–28). But it is a “writing studies” largely removed from the material social realm. 
We can see this removal by comparing his articulation of what writing studies 
might be to otherwise similar calls for a shift from composition studies to writing 
studies (see, for example, Bazerman, “Case”; Trimbur, “Changing”). For Dobrin’s 
references to writing studies ignore large swaths of scholarship that can already lay 
claim to such a name, and he dismisses much of the theorizing of writing affiliated 
with composition while conflating particular writing practices associated with digital 
communication technologies with writing tout court. For example, given Dobrin’s 
hearty “Amen” to Charles Bazerman’s call to broaden composition’s focus to attend 
to the full panoply of writing practices (Dobrin, Postcomposition 25–26), we might 
expect Dobrin will consider at least some instances drawn from the hefty reams 
of scholarship in literacy studies focusing on these practices.8 But in fact, no such 
instances make any appearance in Postcomposition. Instead, writing studies appears 
to be only just emerging ex nihilo in the work of a handful of theorists: something 
new and at odds with all that has come before—one reason Dobrin postulates for 
the difficulty of the work of theorizing writing.
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Likewise, the theorizing of writing in terms of such matters as “ideologies, 
politics, subjectivities, agencies, identities, discourses, rhetorics, and grammars” is 
dismissed from consideration insofar as these are issues “composition studies has 
come to be so invested in,” on the supposition that talk about such issues serves 
merely to enable composition theorists to talk “about the things that other theorists 
in English studies talk about” and thereby “gives claim to legitimacy” (Dobrin 25). 
This dismissal effectively clears the field of theorizing by deeming (at least some) 
extant theorizing something else. That is, although we must theorize writing, not all 
theorizing counts as such. The theorizing of writing in which composition students 
engage, for example, remains invisible. And in Dobrin’s own theorizing, writing is 
more invoked than defined, except in tautological terms (“writing as writing”), and 
largely as a singular, noncount abstraction, not as the diverse set of material social 
practices documented in, well, writing studies scholarship. 
At certain points, Dobrin appears to recognize the corner into which he’s painted 
himself, complaining of the frustration and difficulty of “trying to identify writing as 
independent from other phenomena and the dangers in trying to essentialize writing 
as a scientific (positivist) thing devoid of ecological/textual/network connection to 
other phenomena” (24–25). Encouragingly, he rejects the idea that “the phenomena 
of writing can be/should be identified in an a-contextual, vacuous state not related 
to other phenomena.” But he then insists that we cannot understand writing’s re-
lationships to these until we “understand what the phenomena of writing are and, 
in turn, how writing functions to produce other phenomena”—that is, writing as 
distinct first cause (25). 
Dobrin accounts for his frustration and difficulty as the consequence of “a 
discursive encampment in the boundaries of composition studies” (25). But I am 
arguing, instead, that it is the theoretical framing of writing that leads Dobrin 
into difficulties, for that framing simultaneously grants to writing a purely abstract 
significance, like God, on the one hand, and, on the other, anchors it in what has 
already become a stale set of beliefs about the role of global digital communication 
technologies in redefining what constitutes “writing” and “what the phenomena of 
writing are” (25). As in Smit’s treatment of writing as a noncount, internally uni-
form and discrete entity, Dobrin treats writing as similarly singular in its essence. 
“Writing,” Dobrin asserts, “resists metaphor as a means of explanation both in its 
complexity and in its instability” (134), for “writing is unique in its systemicity in that 
theorizing it does not require a metaphor to explain what it carries or represents, as 
what it carries or represents is either not as important as writing itself or else writ-
ing does not carry or represent anything beyond or outside itself” (150; emphasis 
added). Simultaneously, the one reference to writing as material practice that Dobrin 
repeatedly reiterates identifies writing specifically with the “current hyper-circulatory 
condition of writing,” a condition that, it is claimed, “now demands more complex 
i450-479-May15-CE.indd   460 3/24/15   8:48 AM
 Rewriting Composition 461
theories than composition studies has previously provided,” such as “ecological or 
posthuman rhetorics” (142). 
The contradiction between Dobrin’s call for writing studies and his failure 
to acknowledge or engage the plethora of extant work in writing studies points to 
significant limitations in the theorizing of theory itself. For while Dobrin offers 
postcomposition as a response to real, often seemingly intractable, difficulties of 
pedagogical and administrative work, theory is used not to rethink these but, instead, 
as a means of leaving the seeming difficulties of pedagogy and administrative work 
behind. This is in sharp contrast, for example, to Lynn Worsham’s description of 
theory as the “never-ending work of making ‘really free’ places, lives, and identities,” 
“a deadly serious matter” that, in composition, takes the form of “both the writing 
that scholars in composition studies must do and the writing that we must teach,” 
“driven by a passionate political consciousness [. . .] that seeks the conceptual tools, 
the explanatory frameworks, to engineer social change,” “[c]oming to terms with 
the real world” by bridging “the chasm between the actual and the possible” (104, 
103; see also Resnick and Wolff 37). Likewise, in “Toward a Theory of Theory 
in Composition,” James Zebroski sees theory as a practice to be engaged through 
teaching, observing that characterizations of composition as merely the object of 
critique by Theory (sic) fail to do “justice to the complexity of thinking that occurs 
when a composition teacher works with a student on the production of a text” (31). 
For writers like Worsham and Zebroski, theory is not an escape from places, 
lives, and identities but imbricated in and a means of acting on these. Conversely, as 
Dobrin himself puts it in his postscript to Postcomposition, “Postcomposition moves 
forward, not bound by rethinking, reassessing, or reworking the past but by looking to 
new frontiers for composition theory” (210; emphases added). Pedagogy, rather than 
being rethought, is simply left to its own (old) ways, ostensibly at best as the site for 
application of research, in exchange for the new, relatively unexplored and hence 
relatively unknown world of “theory.” While aligning himself with Paulo Freire’s 
famous critique of the “narration sickness” of banking pedagogy, Dobrin does not, 
as Freire does, rethink and propose an alternative (for example, “problem-posing”) 
pedagogy but, instead, washes his hands of pedagogy altogether, advising us to “stop 
talking about teaching” (Dobrin 191, 190).
As suggested by Dobrin’s metaphors of moving “forward” to “new frontiers,” 
and his identification of his abstracted theorizing of “writing” as open complex sys-
tem with what he repeatedly identifies as the “hyper-circulatory nature of writing 
and the drastic technological shifts we are witnessing regarding the (re)circulation 
of writing” (160; for reiterations, see 83, 133, 137, 142, 185), Dobrin’s project of 
moving postcomposition lands him firmly in the ideology of dominant discourses 
heralding a communicative globalism aligned with fast capitalist ideals of constant 
and rapid change, flexibility, complexity, and above all, the inevitability of these and 
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their break from what has come before.9 So, for example, Dobrin insists that “the 
whole world—or, more specifically, writing—is in the Web because the Web/writ-
ing is (in) the whole world, whether an individual or society is consciously aware of 
it or not” (144).10 Citing approvingly Mark Taylor’s warning that “those who are 
too rigid to fit in rapidly changing worlds become obsolete or are driven beyond the 
edge of chaos to destruction” (Taylor 202; qtd. in Dobrin 168), Dobrin explains that 
“[a]s the complexity of networks with which we interact increases and as the speed 
of network-changes accelerate, the ability to adjust to rapid shift becomes necessary” 
(168). That is, we must adapt or risk being obsolete or destroyed.
Further, in only a decade after Margaret Syverson’s warning that “[a]s contexts 
and technologies for writing continue to change at an ever accelerating pace, we can-
not cling to our familiar, comfortable assumptions about writers, readers, and texts, 
or we will find ourselves increasingly irrelevant and even obstructive” (27; qtd. in 
Dobrin 177), it seems to Dobrin himself that “the situation of writing has changed 
even more dramatically/radically than even Syverson suggests” (177). We have, we 
are told, reached a “tipping point” (177, 185) that has rendered common ways of 
thinking about writing “outmoded” and that requires “creative destruction,” “wiping 
the slate clean and starting anew” (188, though Dobrin then demurs that “there is 
little possibility or need [. . .] to start from a completely blank slate” [188]). Those 
who resist will be doomed as “obstructive,” “outmoded,” “obsolete,” “irrelevant,” 
and therefore quite justifiably “driven to destruction.” To this imperative, it seems, 
There Is No Alternative. 
This is not, of course, to deny changes to communication technologies, the 
pace of these changes, and the importance of attending to these, any more than 
we should deny the fact of “market pressures” on writers. But it is to insist on also 
acknowledging (1) the ongoing, incomplete, varied, and uneven distribution and 
“development” of these changes; (2) the simultaneous presence and interaction of 
other, competing technologies; and (3) consequently, the indeterminate character of 
the effect of these changes on writing and culture more broadly, with, as complexity 
theory itself insists, unintended, even unimaginable consequences as communication 
technologies interact in overdetermined ways with other phenomena. In short, it is 
to refuse to accept pretensions of the hegemonic to hegemony.
r e t H i n k i n g  t e r m s  o F  d i s C i p l i n a r y  d i s C o u r s e
By way of illustrative contrast to the discourse of need in Smit’s and Dobrin’s ar-
guments, I turn briefly to the strategies deployed in two disparate critical works: 
Gibson-Graham’s project against capitalism and Lillis’s project for a sociolinguistics 
of writing. Both, like Dobrin’s and Smit’s, respond to significant limitations in an 
existing field: economics and sociolinguistics, respectively. Both can be characterized 
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as intensely theoretical. However, in these works, theory (and research) are taken 
up not as an alternative to but an engagement in and with the material social realm. 
Or to be more precise, these projects theorize in order to rethink, re-represent, re-
write, rework, and change, rather than escape from or leave behind, the terms (and 
practices) of the disciplines they critique.
In a series of papers and in two books whose titles eerily echo those of Smit 
and Dobrin—The End of Capitalism and Post-Capitalism—Gibson-Graham seek not 
so much to escape capitalism per se but, as the full title of The End of Capitalism 
suggests, change the way in which capitalism is known: to put an End to Capitalism 
(as We Knew It) so that “capitalism per se” can be known, and thereby responded 
to, differently.11 (The subtitle, A Feminist Critique of Political Economy, suggests the 
kind of difference that will be made.) Toward that end, Gibson-Graham reject the 
terms in which capitalism is traditionally thought by both its apologists and its critics: 
as not only dominant but total in its hegemony. Arguments operating within such 
governing terms, including those opposed to capitalism, participate in and thereby 
contribute to “capitalocentric” discourse that reinforces capitalism’s hegemonic posi-
tion. As Gibson-Graham observes of her own earlier work opposing global capital-
ism, “the image of global capitalism that I was producing was actively participating 
in consolidating a new phase of capitalist hegemony” (End, Introduction xxxix). To 
intervene in this dynamic, she explains that, without eschewing acknowledgment of 
the dominant position of capitalist formations currently, she had instead to 
depict economic discourse as hegemonized while rendering the social world as 
economically differentiated and complex. [. . .] Thus one might represent economic 
practice as comprising a rich diversity of capitalist and noncapitalist activities and 
argue that the noncapitalist ones had until now been relatively “invisible” because 
the concepts and discourses that could make them “visible” have themselves been 
marginalized and suppressed. (End xl–xli) 
What dominant discourse had represented (and thus perpetuated) as the full 
story of the economy could be counterposed to alternative, and fuller, representations 
of (economic) activities. Failure to do so, as Gibson-Graham go on to demonstrate, 
acquiesces, and thereby perpetuates belief, in the legitimacy of the terms of argument 
postulating capitalism as not merely hegemonic but hegemony, total in its reach (see 
End, Chapter 1).12 In such arguments, even alternatives to capitalism are defined 
in advance as always already capitalism’s “feminized other [. . .] lack[ing] efficiency 
and rationality [. . .] its productivity [. . .] its global extensiveness, or its inherent 
tendency to dominance and expansion” (7). It is thus that dominant discourse, in-
cluding, significantly, discourse opposed to capitalism, is, as Gibson-Graham put it, 
“capitalocentric.” Gibson-Graham combat this by “cutting capitalism down to size 
(theoretically) and refusing to endow it with excessive power” (End, Introduction xxiv). 
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The subject of Lillis’s argument for a Sociolinguistics of Writing is more recog-
nizably related to questions of composition. For my purpose here, however, what is 
most relevant are the strategies by which Lillis calls for a significant change to the 
focus, assumptions, and practices of sociolinguistics, a change that radically reposi-
tions writing, rather than only or primarily spoken language, as a legitimate and 
significant area of sociolinguistics. The challenge of making this argument resides 
at least in part in dominant conceptualizations of writing in sociolinguistics, for it is 
those conceptions that have relegated writing to the margins of sociolinguistic re-
search. These include the notion that writing is primarily concerned with codifying 
and maintaining specific standard varieties of language use; that it exists in binary 
opposition to speech; and that it is permanent, monomodal, formal, lexically dense, 
distant, context independent, monological, detached, and impersonal whereas speech 
is transient, multimodal, informal, grammatically complex, local, context dependent, 
dialogic, involved, and personal (Lillis, Sociolinguistics 8–10). As Lillis observes, it is 
this framing of writing (and speech) by dominant discourse in sociolinguistics that 
needs to be rethought, its “paradigmatic imaginary” that defines “what its objects 
of study are, and importantly, can or should be” (10). So, for example, “[t]he focus 
on writing [in sociolinguistics] in processes of standardisation and codification hides 
other ways of noticing and understanding what writing is and does in social context, 
thus potentially limiting our understanding of ‘everyday’ writing” (8). 
While Lillis refers to empirical evidence to demonstrate the invalidity of how 
writing has been framed in sociolinguistics, she also cautions that such research alone 
is inadequate insofar as it can easily be accommodated to the dominant terms. For 
instance, when examples of speech are presented that have characteristics ordinar-
ily assigned to writing, dominant discourse in sociolinguistics does not rethink its 
framing of speech and writing but, instead, dubs these examples to be not “genuine” 
speech (and writing with attributes associated with speech are dubbed “speech-like”) 
(Sociolinguistics 9). Hence Lillis must retheorize the binary framing itself to enable 
as legitimate a sociolinguistics of writing. 
The projects of both Gibson-Graham and Lillis are motivated, like Smit’s 
and Dobrin’s, by dissatisfaction with “the field.” But unlike either Smit or Dobrin, 
both Gibson-Graham and Lillis proceed not by declaring the field to be at an end, 
or abandoning the field in pursuit of some other “end” or “frontier,” but by pur-
suing ways of thinking that field differently: for Gibson-Graham most obviously, 
rethinking the hegemony of capitalism; for Lillis, rethinking the position of writing 
in sociolinguistics. And both Gibson-Graham’s and Lillis’s projects are explicitly 
located in a wide range of ongoing research and theory, rather than pretending to 
leave behind the old as a finite, known entity at an end, in order to seek out and 
produce something entirely new. So, for example, Gibson-Graham do not propose 
to abandon political economy (or the study of capitalism) for some other pursuit, 
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or declare these fields to be at an end, nor does Lillis propose to abandon sociolin-
guistics. Instead, they theorize—find ways to think—the governing terms (economy, 
capitalism, sociolinguistics, writing) differently. 
Were Smit and Dobrin to follow their example, they might see that the difficul-
ties they wrestle with are not to be understood in terms of pedagogy versus theory, 
or FYC versus writing studies or WID, or writing versus composition, but, rather, 
how pedagogy, theory, FYC, writing studies, WID, composition, writing have come to be 
understood and practiced. Theory, for example, far from being a stable monolith, 
beneficent or maleficent, in tension with an equivalent monolith of “practice,” itself 
denotes an enormous range of emergent practices taking an enormous range of forms, 
some of which we might want to encourage and some not. The same can be said of 
teaching, administration, FYC, and so on. But it would be wrong to conclude from 
what we deem to be poorly theorized or practiced theory, pedagogy, or administration 
that we should abandon work identified by such terms for something else, because to 
do so would accede to the impoverished definitions shaping that work in a futile effort 
to leave behind composition as material social practice. What is needed instead is a 
reworking: better theory, pedagogy, administration, and so on, with what constitutes 
“better” of course inevitably a matter of debate and, well, work. 
It might be argued (though I will not) that the consequences of the rethink-
ing of a field’s key terms of the sort Gibson-Graham and Lillis engage in are not 
as “revolutionary” as the consequences envisioned by either Smit or Dobrin. But 
ironically, to argue thus would be to remain subject to the very terms, conditions, 
and criteria set by the dominant for what counts as, in fact, revolutionary. I have 
already suggested that Smit’s envisioned change amounts to little that is different 
from WID curricula already on the books, inflected with dominant free market 
ideology.13 Dobrin’s envisioned change, insofar as it promises to abjure composi-
tion as a “teaching subject,” would seem to be more radical. On closer inspection, 
however, his proposed escape to the beyond of composition is fully consonant with 
a dominant discourse of fast capitalism.14 
That Dobrin’s desired move to escape what seem to be the limit-situations 
of composition should land him so unwittingly in a far more troubling position il-
lustrates the role of hegemony in maintaining the hegemonic. Composition studies, 
for Dobrin, is treated as an undifferentiated and stable entity (identified as and with 
“the WPA”), a monolith to which he ascribes an all-encompassing power: not merely 
hegemonic but hegemony.15 And, accordingly, the only route out would appear to 
be the same apocalyptic (impossible) escape imagined by opponents of capitalism 
who accord it a similar identity. It is no wonder, then, that, faced with such a con-
ception of composition, the only option and hope would appear to be “violence” 
(113), “total revolution” (188), or at the very least the appearance of some heroic 
“critical wpa,” someone who is not merely being critical but who disrupts (114). For, 
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as Gibson-Graham warn, “Once we have created a theoretical monster and installed 
it in the social landscape, our thinking and politics will tend to orient themselves 
around its bulk and majesty and our emotional outlook will reflect the diminished 
likelihood of displacing it” (Postcapitalist 199; compare Chaput). Nor is it surprising 
that Dobrin’s proposed alternative lands him so firmly in a position aligned with a 
dominant discourse of globalism condemning to destruction all those who resist its 
good intentions. Thus, just as the treatment of capitalism as monolith, as Gibson-
Graham warn, leads to it “be[ing] seen to operate as a constraint or a limit [. . .] that 
to which other more mutable entities must adapt” (End 14), so Dobrin’s treatment 
of composition perforce renders any efforts in response, Dobrin’s included, merely 
accommodative. Indeed, we can best understand claims to the violent, revolution-
ary, or disruptive character of such efforts as rhetorical ploys to obscure their actual 
status as adaptations, their acquiescence to the terms governing thought, just as the 
ostensibly apocalyptic “end” to composition studies advanced by Smit turns out on 
inspection to be a curriculum well in the mainstream of composition studies.
In other words, hegemony is not so much something against or beyond which 
Dobrin’s and Smit’s opposed projects move but, rather, the homeplace they inhabit. 
Alternatively, following Gibson-Graham’s and Lillis’s strategies, we can recognize, 
in order to break from the hegemonic misrecognitions of, the governing terms of 
arguments and the established frameworks for those terms. This would involve chal-
lenging commonplace distinctions iterated in both Smit’s and Dobrin’s arguments 
(albeit from ostensibly opposed perspectives): that between intellectual work and 
pedagogy; that between a concern with what the dominant identifies as material 
concerns, such as labor and administration, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
theory; and that between writing and composition. It would involve relocating all 
work intersecting with composition studies, including theoretical work, in the ma-
terial social—including the academic institutional—realm so as not to stake out as 
“new” territory fields that are, in fact, already long under cultivation. And, following 
Raymond Williams, it would require refusing to accede to the hegemonic’s false 
claims to being not merely hegemonic but hegemony: the exclusive, total story. For, 
as Williams warns, “[N]o dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in 
reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy [. . . .] [Rather] they select 
from and consequently exclude the full range of human practice” (125; emphasis 
original). In line with this, instead of treating composition, or composition studies, 
in the singular, we would need to recognize composition as both (1) multiple, and (2) 
always emergent, contingent. We can cut Composition down to size, theoretically 
and practically, by refusing to assign it status as an all-powerful, stable monolith and 
rejecting the accuracy of dominant representations of its work.
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C o m p o s i t i o n  a s  i n t e l l e C t u a l  W o r k
Slevin’s critique of dominant work in composition and representations of that work, 
and his heralding of different work in and for composition, provide a useful contrast 
to the efforts of Smit and Dobrin. Like Dobrin, Slevin rejects conservative “academic” 
discourse demanding conformity to community norms through deployment of terms 
such as “engagement,” “collaboration,” and the “common good” (Introducing 235), 
identifying it with the project of colonization (6). Slevin identifies intellectual work as 
by definition opposed to such discourse: as “the critical examination of the truthful-
ness of knowledge created, received, and exchanged” (236). However, whereas both 
Dobrin and Smit locate intellectual work outside the material realm—for Dobrin, 
part of its appeal as escape from the merely academic; for Smit, the basis for rejecting 
it—Slevin locates intellectual work insistently in the material social realm, including 
the academic institutional realm and, most notably, the scene of pedagogy.16 So, for 
example, Slevin argues that 
teachers of writing [. . .] can bring into being a radical reorganization of the professional 
hierarchy. The very concerns that locate us at the base or bottom of the prevailing 
power system need to be elaborated, so that we can alter both the theory and practice 
of English studies. Our aim, then, should be not simply to resituate ourselves within 
institutions but, in doing so, to reconceive and reconstruct those institutions. (“Depo-
liticizing” 10; emphases added)
And he identifies the pedagogical scene as the site of intellectual work, crediting the 
emergence of a “writing movement” not to theorists or researchers but to “the pres-
ence and intellectual energy of students who questioned the hegemony of received 
ways of reading and writing” (Introducing 2; emphasis added). 
In seeming alignment with both Smit and Dobrin, Slevin rejects “promoting the 
‘field’ of composition studies and within it composition specialists,” but he identi-
fies such promotion not with composition per se but with “current representations of 
composition” (Introducing 3; emphasis added). Hence his aim is not to retreat from, 
put an end to, or move beyond composition represented thus but, rather, to offer “a 
different way of representing the work and workers of composition, not as a field one 
works ‘in’ but rather as a set of activities and practices one works ‘with’” (3). Such 
reconceptualizing, he suggests, “refines the meaning of disciplinary work to include 
teaching and learning and broadens the meaning of workers to create alliances of 
literacy teachers and learners across conventional educational boundaries and even 
beyond educational institutions as ordinarily conceived” (3). So, whereas Dobrin 
calls for bringing the attention of “intellectual and scholarly inquiry and specula-
tion” to writing phenomena “beyond composition” because “[w]riting is more than 
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composition (studies)” (Postcomposition 2), and whereas Smit argues for abandon-
ing such inquiry altogether in favor of settling for what is officially on demand by 
disciplines and workplaces, Slevin argues for expanding those recognized as fellow 
scholars engaging in the intellectual work of composition to comprise not only col-
lege writing teachers and students but all those engaged with composing, including 
seven-year-olds composing thank-you notes (see Introducing 50–51). And instead of 
aiming to meet composition students’ ostensible disciplinary and vocational needs, 
as Smit insists, Slevin argues for composition to make “other needs imaginable and 
their realization possible” (Introducing 239). So, whereas both Smit and Dobrin 
work within established academic institutional categories and hierarchies to extend, 
end, or move beyond the present “field” in what are ultimately quite familiar ways, 
Slevin calls for making composition a “movement for institutional change within and 
among all levels of education and many different fields of study and learning,” one 
“concerned not with remediating lack but with examining and understanding dif-
ferences as they enrich education” (Introducing 52; emphasis original). 
This is a far cry from either Dobrin’s view of attention to students and the 
management of curricula as at best a way to “attract the attention of local resources, 
garner support from local administrations, and often solve local problems” (26), or 
Smit’s view of these matters as service to those higher up in the academic and social 
hierarchy and the marketplace. That Slevin’s proposals appear to have garnered 
significantly less attention than Smit’s and Dobrin’s can be accounted for by the very 
familiarity of the thinking to be found in the latter two, their apocalyptic rhetoric 
notwithstanding, and the difficulty of recognizing Slevin’s thinking, given the devia-
tion of Slevin’s proposals from the terms and frameworks of dominant, hegemonic 
discourse on composition.17 Familiar terms—theory, pedagogy, service, discipline, writ-
ing, composition—are in Slevin assigned unfamiliar meanings and thus pose genuine 
difficulty, the difficulty of thinking composition differently. 
This is not to say that Slevin’s own arguments are beyond dispute—an impos-
sibility for any argument—but rather that his efforts to rewrite composition, like 
Gibson-Graham’s efforts to rewrite economics and Lillis’s to rewrite sociolinguistics, 
work against dominant representations of these fields rather than accepting (and 
thereby promoting) the legitimacy or inevitability of dominant definitions and valua-
tions of these. And, unlike Smit and Dobrin, Slevin locates composition firmly in the 
material social realm—in academic institutions and the work of students, teachers, 
and scholars—as practices in, with, and on these as “intellectual work”—a phrase 
paradoxical in its root sense. Difference, for Slevin, is not something to be pursued 
in lieu of composition but rather an inevitable, pervasive, and defining feature of 
composition as a material social practice, located in space and time.
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r H e t o r i C ,  W r i t i n g  s t u d i e s ,  a n d  t H e  m u l t i m o d a l :  
r e p l a C e m e n t  t H r o u g H  s u p p l e m e n t
If Smit and Dobrin argue from the position of an ostensible present of “composi-
tion” to a prospective future beyond, or following the end of, composition, others 
have attempted to resolve the difficulty of work in composition—its irredeemable 
location in the material social realm—by aligning it with, or broadening its reach 
to include, traditions, forms, and materials seen as other than or additional to the 
practices traditionally identified with the work of composition. While adopting 
less apocalyptic rhetoric than we find in Postcomposition or The End of Composition 
Studies, advocates for these changes are aligned with them in assuming a deficit in 
composition for which the presumed addition or substitution is offered as solution. 
Traditional frameworks for and definitions of composition, pedagogy, academic 
disciplinarity, and value are left unquestioned—the very frameworks and definitions 
by which composition must be seen as lacking—and the solutions or improvements 
that are offered are aligned with and work within these frameworks and definitions.
One difficulty in assessing these efforts is that, in one sense, many of the prof-
fered changes call for doing what in fact is, or has been, already part of traditional 
work in composition, but that dominant conceptions of this work have blinded us 
to (see, for example, Palmeri’s demonstration of composition’s traditional attention 
to “multimodal” composition [Palmeri, Remixing]). Hence we might agree with the 
appropriateness of the activities called for while rejecting the claim that engaging in 
them somehow constitutes a radical break. Simultaneously, however, the performa-
tive effects of these representations of composition as lacking, in need of something 
else that’s “new” or “alternative,” cannot be denied: the hegemonic may not be total 
or exclusive, but it is by definition hegemonic. This complicates efforts to retrieve 
what the hegemonic denies and to learn to recognize, in forms and practices we are 
predisposed to understand in limited ways, the accomplishment of more and other 
than what is claimed. Further, we have to contend not only with dominant ways 
of conceptualizing composition, but with dominant conceptualizations of what 
constitute the alternatives to it—conceptualizations that are, in fact, themselves 
manifestations of the dominant. 
I’ll offer three quick examples to illustrate the difficulties, and possibilities, of 
breaking from dominant frameworks for conceptualizing composition: efforts to 
identify, or link, composition with rhetoric; efforts to change, or add to, the forms 
and materials students are to work with and produce in composing, most commonly 
by focusing on what is termed multimodal composition; and efforts to rename compo-
sition “writing studies.” Efforts to identify composition with rhetoric posit rhetoric 
as the antidote to what ails composition, eliding the fact that rhetoric is and long 
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has been, in at least some sense, already subsumed by work in composition, if taking 
forms not recognized as “rhetoric.” So, for example, Sharon Crowley has described 
rhetoric as something with which to “inoculate” composition to give composition 
“respectability,” albeit without success (“Composition Is Not”). In such arguments, 
rhetoric is presumed to be discrete from composition yet necessary to the health of 
the latter (but not the reverse): a means of enabling composition to (finally) attain 
status as a traditional academic discipline, if only by linking it with one imagined to 
already enjoy such status. The possibility that such disciplinary status itself may be 
suspect rather than something to be aspired to is not, in such arguments, entertained.18
We can see a comparable set of assumptions in arguments that composition 
needs to expand the range of types of composition addressed to include multimodal 
composition. Often these arguments are couched in terms of yielding to an imperative 
like the imperative Dobrin invokes, one issued by rapid changes in the communica-
tive technologies dominating contemporary (and, it seems, future) culture, locally 
and globally, that demand we adjust to or risk being annihilated by.19 But framing 
the issue as a new technological imperative either to resist or embrace assumes the 
radically new—yet, somehow simultaneously known, knowable—character of what 
is coming to composition (or has arrived), the fixed and limited character of what 
has been, and the lack of alternative to this framing of what we face: an ideological 
misrecognition of modality in alignment with dominant neoliberalism’s insistence 
on valuing what is claimed as new, its account of limitations (or advantages, for that 
matter) to the (stable, finite, settled) “old,” the necessity of “creative destruction,” 
and above all, flexibility in adapting to and providing what the dominant demands.20 
Most damagingly, such framing accepts dominant ascriptions of the modalities 
of particular forms, and the actual and potential modalities engaged in with those 
forms, suggesting that multimodal composition is a (different) choice rather than 
an inevitability, something other than the norm rather than the norm itself. Such 
ascriptions reinforce dominant conceptions of composition—as opposed to multi-
modal composition—as modally singular monolith. But, as John Trimbur and Karen 
Press have recently observed, “[M]ultimodality itself is not new, nor is it a break 
from the past. Multimodality is new as a term, a conceptual terrain that surfaced at a 
particular historical conjuncture, goaded by the need to understand dramatic changes 
in the means of communication” (Trimbur and Press; emphasis original). Likewise, 
“monomodality” is not an accurate characterization of print texts but, rather, a set of 
“ideological claims” about such texts (Trimbur and Press): a misrecognition of those 
texts as (modally) less than those deemed multimodal.21 Accepting such misrecog-
nitions renders modality not an open question for composition students and their 
teachers to work on and with, but, rather, as at best a matter of a set of predefined 
menu items bestowed (or newly “permitted”) by teachers for students to select from: a 
matter of no more than market “choice” among what are understood as commodities. 
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Calls for composition to somehow merge with or be renamed as writing studies 
appear to align with calls to add rhetoric or multimodal forms of composition to 
(mere) composition insofar as they seek to add consideration of other kinds of writ-
ing to the writing traditionally identified with composition, or insofar as, by giving 
composition a more traditionally recognizable academic subject matter (content), it 
will garner composition, now renamed writing studies, more academic institutional 
respectability. As Trimbur explains in his review of these calls, if composition has 
heretofore identified writing primarily as “participial”—something people do—writ-
ing studies seems to render it a noun, a phenomenon one studies—“the material 
manifestations and consequences of writing as it circulates in the world” (“Changing” 
18). This nominalization would seem to broaden the kinds of writing studied while 
simultaneously giving composition a recognizable subject matter and a justification 
for “verticalizing” its curriculum—given the enormous range of kinds of writing 
available for study, a major in writing studies would itself seem to be imperative 
once writing is accepted as a legitimate subject of inquiry. 
But as with arguments for linking composition with rhetoric or adding multi-
modal composition, these arguments elide the fact that writing studies, far from rep-
resenting a new identity for composition, has always been part of composition—not 
only in the conventional form of scholarly contributions to studies of writing (though 
there are plenty of these) but also in the ongoing, daily writing and study of writing by 
composition students and their teachers. That such work is not recognized as writing 
studies is a consequence of the fact that this work does not follow methodologies, nor 
lead to the production of textual forms, conventionally recognized as manifestations 
of writing studies. So, as with calls for linking composition with rhetoric or explor-
ing multimodal composition, we might respond to calls to transform composition 
into writing studies as welcome and unremarkable, on the one hand, and yet also 
impertinent, asking for work to begin that in fact has long been underway, though 
taking forms dominant culture fails to recognize as such work. Worse, in asking that 
composition take up work that it already engages in, such calls risk maintaining, and 
even strengthening, dominant culture’s rendering of composition itself as lacking, 
its work as not work at all—as, in and by itself, illegitimate.
r e W r i t i n g  C o m p o s i t i o n
It would be contradictory to this argument’s insistence on the always emergent, 
varied, and variable character of work in composition to identify a different end to its 
work—to argue for a specific set of practices that, instead of or in addition to those 
just discussed, would somehow resolve composition’s difficulties.22 But one might 
imagine projects that, like Slevin’s, pursue composition work outside hegemonic 
expectations both for what is conventional and for what constitutes a break from 
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the conventional: projects, for example, that take as their focus work in composi-
tion that the dominant typically deems insignificant, when it does not dismiss it 
from consideration altogether, precisely because it is ideologically unrecognizable 
as either conventional or unconventional. We can see the contours of such work in 
David Bartholomae’s declaration that he teaches first-year composition as “a certain 
kind of intellectual project—one that requires [him] to think out critical problems 
of language, knowledge, and culture through the work of ‘ordinary’ or ‘novice’ or 
student writers” (“What” 24). For although Bartholomae aligns this work with the 
project of “criticism,” he cautions that it is not criticism as conventionally recog-
nized but, instead, a “practical criticism (or criticism-in-practice)” (21). Such work, 
he acknowledges, requires a willingness to “pay attention to common things” (28) 
and appears ordinary in the extreme. As he further cautions, this is “professionally 
difficult. [. . .] [I]t ends with revisions that are small, local, and difficult to value. It 
assumes the direct intervention in specific projects where (from a certain angle of 
vision) the gains are small” (21).
But while those revisions may well appear, from dominant perspectives, to be 
“local, and difficult to value,” with “gains [that] are small,” we accept such perspectives 
at the peril of losing sight of the actual work accomplished through such small, local 
gains. Even those gains that appear purely idiosyncratic, restricted to the individual 
student discovering what everyone around her seems to already know, are, from the 
argument I’ve been advancing, real and new, once located in time and space, and 
the writer producing a difference, however slight, even if the writing appears highly 
conventional.23
Moreover, and conversely, there is a use to the ascribed ordinariness and “small-
ness” of such gains. In his debate with Bartholomae, Peter Elbow has called for 
preserving the writing course as a place to “cultivate [. . .] some tufts of what grows 
wild outside,” protected from the academic (“Response” 90). This accepts dominant 
understandings of the academic as hegemony, something from which students (and 
others) need protection. But we can instead see the composition course as a preserve 
for what can grow “inside” the academic site as material social realm, somewhat, 
if not entirely, removed from the otherwise incessant pressure for commodifica-
tion. The fact that work in composition courses can appear useless, not relevant, 
insignificant, not mattering, can allow for experimentation, thinking, and reflection 
of real use-value, once we come to understand these as themselves material social 
practices more easily engaged in when there is an allotted space, meeting time, and 
the possibility of collaboration and a project: the briar patch we can, after all, make 
ourselves at home in.24 
This is aligned with Bartholomae’s earlier description of composition itself as 
not a traditional discipline but, instead, a “site where English [has been] open for 
negotiation (or renegotiation),” and that has “enabled the expression of a funda-
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mental anxiety about ‘required English’” and “produced new ways of talking about 
language, writing, and pedagogy” as what “we can never simply study” (“Freshman” 
44, 45). Composition, he suggests, is not only or merely “an abstract subject” but 
also “something materially present, a course and its students” (47). I am suggest-
ing that in the familiar forms of ordinary work in composition, represented in, for 
example, a composition course in which students produce seemingly insignificant 
writing circulating only within the confines of that course, work of real, if always 
contingent, use-value can take place, and that the material social conditions typical 
of the site of such a course make possible academic intellectual work that cannot 
take place elsewhere, outside such conditions.25 
Likewise, at least for some of us, similar conditions make possible pursuit of 
what, from dominant perspectives, seems useless, irrelevant research: reworking, 
by rewriting, the known and common (and commonly known), in myriad ways, to 
make it new (again). Granted, there are significant barriers that would seem to justify 
despair at engaging in such research in light of the lack of support for it and the lack 
of recognizable impact it may have on policy and practice.26 But I am suggesting, 
too, that such despair is in part a consequence of allegiance to a mythical notion of 
academic professional disciplinarity and the function dominant culture has assigned 
it. To abandon allegiance to that notion does not mean we stop researching, nor is 
it to hearken back to suspect calls for knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but, rather, 
that we adopt a more humble perspective on such work: to take up (again and again) 
“basic” research, and to do so in a manner that embraces all the pejoratives associ-
ated with that term. It is to identify the work of composition—in the twin sites of 
teaching and research—as learning, which (fortunately) is an inevitability but always 
with unanticipated consequences and results always local and contingent.
* * *
I began by asserting that composition is a historical project, the name given to work 
done in US colleges and universities by students and teachers as they engage and me-
diate differences in written language. Dominant, limited conceptions of composition 
deny that work (and its value), posing instead a “discourse of need” about composition 
itself as lacking and, therefore, in need of either abandonment or supplement. Against 
this discourse, I have argued that what is needed is not something ostensibly new 
or different, either as alternative or supplement to composition, but instead a new 
understanding of composition: a rewriting of composition as something other than 
gaping need. Such rewriting requires rethinking the terms used to define, and limit, 
composition: writing, pedagogy, theory, rhetoric, modality, and composition itself. To fail 
to do so, I have argued, is to align oneself with dominant ideological constructions 
of these that consign composition to mere service to the dominant, or worse, and 
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of what might constitute legitimate alternatives or “improvements” to it. It is these 
constructions, not composition per se, that threaten to keep composition shackled. 
We need to break with the misrecognition of both composition and the proffered 
alternatives and improvements to it in order to give full play to all that might and 
does get accomplished in the work of composition.
As this suggests, we need, if not a new language, then a different way of inflecting 
the existing language to rewrite composition—a politics of language in composition 
theory, scholarship, teaching, and learning. This will demand the energy of us all at 
every site and instance of our work, in our teaching and study. Such work is difficult, 
to be sure. But once we abandon the attempt to abandon composition, we may learn 
to recognize what composition might be.
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